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Abstract 
Perhaps the most basic network in modern life is the division of labor. It certainly rates alongside family, 
school, and town. That inexorably leads to a discussion of how resources are allocated within this division, 
who exercizes power, and what happens when the network meets a seemingly natural or unnatural end. For 
networks that may appear extremely stable can come to abrupt or scheduled conclusions, when a company 
goes bankrupt or a school cohort breaks up. This article briefly examines the history of the division of labor, 
with particular reference to culture and to its internationalization, concluding with a brief discussion of how 
short-term networks can lead to the exploitation of workers and have a devastating ecological impact. 
Agenda
The Division of Labor .............................................................................................................................. 32 
Culture ................................................................................................................................................... 32 
Networks Alive, Exploiting and Polluting ................................................................................................... 34 




 Toby Miller is a Professor in the Department of Media & Cultural Studies at the University of California, 
Riverside. He studies the media, sport, labor, gender, race, citizenship, politics, and cultural policy via po-
litical economy, textual analysis, archival research, and ethnography. Editor of Television & New Media 
and Co-Editor of Social Identities, he also edits the book series Popular Culture and Everyday Life (Lang), 
and was previously Chair of the International Communication Association Philosophy of Communication 
Division, Editor of Journal of Sport & Social Issues, and Co-Editor of Social Text, the Blackwell Cultural 
Theory Resource Centre, and the book series Film Guidebooks (Routledge), Sport and Culture (Minne-
sota), and Cultural Politics (Minnesota. He is the author and editor of over 30 books, the most recent of 
which are Makeover Nation: The United States of Reinvention (2008) and The Contemporary Hollywood 
Reader (2009). His next book, in press, is Television Studies: The Basics. 
 +1 (917) 917-7512679,  tobym@ucr.edu 
IRIE 
International Review of Information Ethics Vol. 11 (09/2009) 
 
Tobi Miller: 
The Oldest New Network: The Division Of Cultural Labor And Its Ecological Impact 32 
The Division of Labor 
In the 14th and 15th centuries, a mercantile system 
arose from calculations, appropriations, and ex-
changes of climate, geography, flora, and fauna. 
Exchanges of goods turned into exchanges of labor. 
As food commodities made their way around the 
globe, so did people, often as slaves. When machin-
ery was developed, work split into an industrial 
mode. Between the 16th and 18th centuries, cities 
grew into manufacturing sites, populations urban-
ized, and wages displaced farming as the basis of 
subsistence (Lang and Hines 1993: 15). These new 
forms of labor were institutionalized in empire. In 
the 18th and 19th centuries, manufacturing went on 
at the centre, with food and raw materials imported 
from the periphery. In the 20th century, assembly-
line control, with its quid pro quo of sufficient wages 
to buy the products being assembled, became a 
Fordist paradigm. The labor force was divided 
between blue-collar workers, who undertook tasks 
on the line, and white-collar workers, who observed 
them (Scott 1998: 18).  
Differences of opinion emerged about the signifi-
cance of the balance of trade to a country‘s wellbe-
ing. Mercantilists thought it should be controlled, but 
free traders wanted market forces to rule in accor-
dance with factor endowments and an international 
division of labor. Keynesian responses to the De-
pression made protectionism a more legitimate 
position in economic theory, until stagflation 
emerged from the transnational phase that com-
menced after the war. By the mid-1980s, offshore 
production by multinationals exceeded trade be-
tween states. Since that time, the global capitalist 
economy has depended on the integration of pro-
duction processes; even when geographically dis-
persed, they remain governed by states and para-
statal institutions in the service of capital accumula-
tion. Products are first made and consumed in the 
centre, in a major industrial economy; then exported 
to the periphery; and finally produced and con-
sumed „out there,‖ once technology is standardized 
and savings can be made on the labor front. Goods 
and services owned and vended by the periphery 
rarely make their way into the centre as imports. 
Hence the idea of a New International Division of 
Labor (NIDL). This model reveals that developing 
markets for labor and sales, and the shift from the 
spatial sensitivities of electrics to the spatial insensi-
tivities of electronics, have pushed businesses 
beyond treating Third World countries as suppliers 
of raw materials, to look on them as shadow-setters 
of the price of work, competing among themselves 
and with the First World for employment. As produc-
tion split across continents, the prior division of the 
globe into a small number of empires and satellites 
and a majority of underdeveloped countries has 
been compromised. Folker Fröbel and his collabora-
tors (1980) christened this trend the NIDL. Whereas 
the old IDL had kept labor costs down through the 
formal and informal slavery of colonialism (the trade 
in people and indentureship) and importation of 
cheap raw materials with value added in the metro-
pole, successful action by the working class at the 
centre redistributed income. The response from 
capital was to export production to the Third World, 
focusing increasingly on young women workers. 
China is the contemporary epitome of the NIDL at 
work. 
Culture 
So how does the division of labor fit with culture? 
Artists, musicians, poets, and scholars traveled 
across royal courts, salons, and universities for 
many centuries prior to capitalism. But that revolu-
tion in social relations in Europe and the US was 
accompanied by a new method and history to the 
exchange of bodies, ideologies, images, and money. 
Culture, which had previously referred to tending 
land, came to personify instrumentalism at the same 
time as negating it; on the one hand, there was the 
industrialization of agriculture; on the other, the 
tutoring of individual taste. German, French, and 
Spanish dictionaries of the 18th century indicate a 
shift in the meaning of culture towards spiritual 
cultivation and away from animal husbandry. With 
the spread of literacy and publishing, and the ad-
vent of customs and laws that were shared, admin-
istered, and understood through the printed word, 
cultural texts supplemented and supplanted physical 
force as sources of authority. As the Industrial 
Revolution moved populations to cities, food was 
imported and new textual forms were exchanged, 
for both practical and entertainment purposes. 
Along came a society of consumers and an art 
world. There was an obvious corollary in labor 
terms: the emergence of poligrafi in 15th century 
Venice, and hacks in 18th century London. They 
wrote popular books about correct forms of con-
duct—instructions on daily life (Briggs and Burke, 
2003). Thus began a division of cultural labor in the 
modern sense. 
With the First World losing manufacturing jobs 
because of the NIDL from the 1970s, culture be-
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came a core employment site in the Global North. 
Most new jobs within the First World now come 
from the culture and media sector. Their connection 
is knowledge, information, emotions, and communi-
cation (Hardt and Negri 2000: 285). Daniel Bell 
discerns four changes in the Global North‘s economy 
from production to services: 
 the preeminence of professionalism and tech-
nique 
 the importance of theory to innovate and 
generate public policies 
 the formation of a discourse of the future; 
and 
 new intellectual technologies that help make 
decisions (Mattelart 2003: 77-78) 
This is a technocratic vision dominated by experts, a 
world of modernity, of rationality, of the ability to 
apply reason to problems, and seek salvation in the 
secular. It favors ecological metaphors to describe 
workspaces, emptying out the core environmental 
impact on nature of industry at the same time as it 
denies the solidarity and security of ongoing em-
ployment. Manuel Castells suggests we inhabit an 
epoch of networks of knowledge workers, effectively 
a ruling class operating through technique and 
technology. This is not the daily society of humanity, 
but a society, after Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
of control (Mattelart 2003: 143). Castells discerns 
two economic models at work here. In the first 
system, the Anglo-Saxon one, services substitute for 
manufactures, with finance displacing physical labor. 
The second model, from Japan and Germany, com-
bines the two, rather than substituting one for the 
other (Hardt and Negri 2000: 286). For their part, 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri develop the idea of 
immaterial labor to describe the tendency to ex-
change information, knowledge, and emotion, 
filtered through the computer and its methods of 
invigilation, and abstracted from physical work 
(2000: 290-92). While this notion of immaterial 
labor captures the realities of work in the post-
industrial sector, it is awkwardly close to forgetting 
the fundamental ecology of the division of labor—
that this is not a network of equality, but domina-
tion, and one that imperils the Earth. 
Using typologies from Fritz Machlup and Armand 
Mattelart, I propose the following types of paid 
cultural and media workers: 
 creators, who make new art and ideas 
 transmitters, who communicate the art and 
ideas of others 
 transformers, who change art and ideas via 
form 
 processors, who change art and ideas via 
formats 
 interpreters, who change art and ideas via 
idiom; and 
 analysts, who create new interpretations 
(Mattelart 2003: 63) 
Within the culture industries we find the following 
groups of workers, albeit with much overlap: 
 creators, such as musicians, directors, writers, 
journalists, and technical workers 
 artisans, including sound engineers, editors, 
cinematographers, and web designers 
 impresarios, who connect proprietors and ex-
ecutives to creators 
 proprietors and executives, who control em-
ployment and investment and negotiate with 
states; and 
 audiences, whose labor as workers pays for 
content, whose labor as interpreters gives it 
meaning, and whose labor as imaginary peo-
ple is its alibi 
These groups operate within institutional contexts, 
specifically: 
  private bureaucracies, controlling investment 
and distribution 
 public bureaucracies, offering what capitalism 
cannot 
 small businesses, run by charismatic individu-
als; and 
 networks, fluid associations formed to under-
take specific projects 
Private bureaucracies continue to control most of 
the cultural/copyright industries, but very frequently 
in collaboration with less formal networks, while 
public bureaucracies experience pressure to comport 
themselves in an ever-more commercial manner. 
Since the demise of the production-line, car-
assembly-like Hollywood studio-system of produc-
tion that applied between about 1920 and 1970, but 
was eroding by the late 1950s, the US film industry 
has been a pioneer in the loose model of employ-
ment beloved of contemporary management. Jobs 
are constantly ending, starting, and moving. Holly-
wood exemplifies ‗flexible specialization,‘ a shift from 
life-long employment to casual labor. It has an 
economic commitment to ‗permanent innovation,‘ 
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and a political commitment to control its environ-
ment (Piore and Sabel 1984: 17). 
Workers and bosses strike complex, transitory 
arrangements on a project basis via temporary 
organisations, with small numbers of divers hands 
involved at each stage other than production, when 
sizeable crews function both together and semi-
autonomously. Places and networks matter in terms 
of textual cues, policy incentives, educational sup-
port, financing, and skills. Time matters because of 
cost and marketing. Work may be subject to local, 
national, regional, and international fetishization of 
each component, matching the way that the labor 
undertaken is largely fetishized away from the final 
text. Conventional organizational charts are inade-
quate to the task, especially if one seeks to elude 
the conventions of hierarchy through capital whilst 
recognizing the eternal presence of managerial 
surveillance. Business leeches want flexibility in the 
numbers they employ, the technology they use, the 
place where they produce, and the amount that 
they pay—and inflexibility of ownership and control 
(Eisenmann and Bower, 2000). 
There were 3,500 film and television companies in 
Southern California in 2002. Perhaps 0.1% of them 
hired over a thousand people, while about 75% had 
no more than four employees (Miller et al., 2005). 
This makes the industry seem dispersed, and has 
led to theorizations of it as an open ecological 
system. But the power and logic of domination by a 
small number of vast entities is achieved via a huge 
globalizing network of subcontracted firms and 
individuals, in turn mediated through unions, em-
ployer associations, education, and the state. Movie 
capital is footloose in its networking, and destructive 
in its ecology, as the case studies below will illus-
trate. 
Networks Alive, Exploiting and 
Polluting 
Mexico became a key site for offshore Hollywood 
production following the success of Titanic (James 
Cameron, 1997). During the film‘s production, the 
national film studio Churubusco was renovated and 
a National Film Commission established, with satel-
lites across the country‘s 31 states, offering Holly-
wood moguls everything from trips in governors‘ 
helicopters to many other, less exotic, services. 
Mexico‘s new film „union‖ set up shop in Los Ange-
les to reassure industry mavens of its cooperative-
ness and to remain up-to-date on US pay rates—in 
order to undercut them. Not surprisingly, Rupert 
Murdoch cites approvingly the number of European 
workers invisibly employed in the making of Titanic: 
‗this cross-border cultural co-operation is not the 
result of regulation, but market forces. It‘s the 
freedom to move capital, technology and talent 
around the world that adds value, invigorates ailing 
markets, creates new ones.‘ National Public Radio 
reported that Rupert‘s very own Fox company was 
asking the Mexican Government to offer further 
financial incentives for runaways even as the privati-
zation of the film industry during the 1990s had 
decimated local production. Overall, the present 
conjuncture is a screen testimony to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, which has seen 
the average number of offshore productions in 
Mexico per year increase from seven to seventeen 
as the shipment of film stock and special-effects 
equipment is facilitated, especially for low-budget 
productions while local production spiraled down-
wards, from 747 films in the decade prior to the 
Treaty, to 212 in the decade since (Maxwell and 
Miller, 2006). 
Restoring Mexico to the Hollywood map gained 
James Cameron the Order of the Aztec Eagle from a 
grateful government, which offers docile labor, 
minimal bureaucracy, a weak peso, many US-trained 
technicians and liaison services. The National Film 
Commission‘s web site states that almost 3,000 
foreign productions were shot there between 1995 
and 2002, from airline commercials to feature films 
(Maxwell and Miller, 2006). 
But there is a cruel irony to the globalization of 
cultural labor through loose networks: people sub-
merged at the end of the credits (or not listed at all) 
„owed‖ their livelihoods to a boat sunk by invisible 
ice and business hubris. The village was cut off from 
the sea and local fisheries by a walled ‗movie maqui-
ladora‘ built to keep them away from production. 
Fox‘s chlorination of surrounding seawater deci-
mated the ranks of sea urchins, which Popotla had 
long fished, and reduced overall fish levels by a 
third. Meanwhile, it was revealed that the overall 
cost of the film could have provided safe drinking 
water to 600,000 people for a year. (Miller et al. 
2005: 165). The Popotlanos demonstrated their 
environmental consciousness by decorating the wall 
with rubbish to ridicule the filmmakers and call for 
mariscos libre (freedom for shellfish) (for photos, 
see rtmark.com/popotlaimages.html). 
Fox again ran into difficulties while making The 
Beach (2000) in Thailand‘s Maya Bay, part of Phi Phi 
Islands National Park, where a (textually) modern-
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day Eden suddenly turns nasty for jaded tourists. 
Thai environmental and pro-democracy activists 
publicized the arrogant despoliation they expe-
rienced. Natural scenery was bulldozed because it 
did not fit the company‘s fantasy of a tropical idyll: 
sand dunes were relocated, flora rearranged, and a 
„new‖ strip of coconut palms planted. The producers 
paid off the government with a donation to the 
Royal Forestry Department, and campaigned with 
the Tourism Authority of Thailand to twin the film as 
a promotion for the country. Meanwhile, the next 
monsoon saw the damaged sand dunes of the 
region collapse, its natural defenses against erosion 
destroyed by Hollywood bulldozers. All the while, 
director Danny Boyle claimed the film was „raising 
environmental consciousness‖ among a local popula-
tion that was allegedly „behind‖ US levels of 
„awareness‖ (Miller et al. 2005). 
Conclusion 
We inhabit a world where flexibility is the mega-sign 
of affluence, and precariousness its flipside. One 
person‘s calculated risk is another‘s burden of labor, 
inequality is represented as the outcome of a moral 
test, and the young are supposed to regard insecu-
rity as an opportunity rather than a constraint. 
Antonio Negri (2007) refers to people mired in 
contingent media work as the cognitariat, because 
they have high levels of educational attainment, and 
great facility with cultural technologies and genres. 
The cognitariat plays key roles in the production and 
circulation of goods and services, through both 
creation and coordination. Today‘s ‗culturalisation of 
production‘ may enable these intellectuals, by plac-
ing them at the center of world economies, but it 
also disables them, because it does so under condi-
tions of flexible production and ideologies of „free-
dom.‖ This new proletariat is not defined in terms of 
factories, manufacturing, or opposition to ruling-
class power and ideology. Indeed, it is formed from 
those whose immediate forebears, with similar or 
less cultural capital, were the salariat, and confident 
of guaranteed health care and retirement income. It 
lacks both the organization of the traditional work-
ing class and the political entrée of the old middle 
class. 
What used to be the fate of artists and musicians—
where „making cool stuff‖ and working with relative 
autonomy was meant to outweigh ongoing employ-
ment—has become a norm across virtually every 
sector of the economy. The outcome is contingent 
labor as a way of life—the triumph of a New Inter-
national Division of Cultural Labor. The results are 
even worse for the unskilled labor of those who are 
outside the cognitariat, like many Popotlanos and 
Thais. It is a timely reminder for those who fetishize 
the supposedly new „creative‖ industries or the 
information society and economy that it repeats 
many of the humanly exploitative and environmen-
tally disastrous escapades of smoky industrialism. 
There would be no culture, no media, without labor. 
It is the beating heart of creativity and social justice. 
When it is reduced to the contingency of network 
metaphors, it becomes precarious. And when eco-
logical ideas are removed from their explanation of 
the environment, that precariousness produces an 
eternal pollution. 
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